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CONSTITUTION MAKING AFTER NATIONAL
CATASTROPHES: GERMANY IN 1949 AND 1990

INGA MARKOVITS*
Constitutions, usually, are new beginnings: after some seismic
shift in a country's history-a revolution, a lost war, a collapse of
government-a nation sets out to reinvent itself. It can do so by
looking back into the past or forward into the future. Most constitutions will do a bit of both, but their character will differ depending
on which time perspective is foremost in the drafters' minds. A
backward-looking constitution will look to past mistakes -perhaps
mistakes that brought about the nation's current predicaments in
the first place; will try to prevent their repetition, hold on to past
successes, and will favor solid and cautious government structures
based on reason and experience. A forward-looking constitution will
try to create a new and better world. It will distrust the solutions of
the past, which, after all, did not prevent the disarray that the new
constitution now must help to overcome. Instead, it will aim for new
government structures whose design is fueled by hopes and political
convictions.
In this Essay, I will compare three twentieth century German
constitutions; all three, responses to political disintegration and
collapse. The first, the German Grundgesetz of 1949, drew its
inspiration mainly from the past and became extraordinarily
successful. The other two, the first East German Constitution, also
of 1949, and the last East German attempt at constitution making,
the Roundtable Constitution of 1990, looked mainly to the future
and were thorough failures. I will describe how considerations for
the past or for the future shaped these constitutions, examine what
went right or wrong in their respective lives, and ask whether we
can draw any lessons from their fate that may explain what it is
*
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that makes a constitution succeed or fail. Did the drafters' attitudes
to time play any role in the effectiveness of their creations?
I. THE THREE CONSTITUTIONS

A. When the three Western Military Governors, in the "Frankfurt
Documents" of July 1, 1948, authorized the West Germans to create
a constitution that would establish a new, democratic, law-abiding
federal state in their war-torn and divided country, local and
regional German self-government already existed in all four Allied
occupation zones.1 It was a more or less independent, central
German government that the Allies now were looking for. In the
West, newly recognized political parties-above all, the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party
(SPD)-ran eleven Land (state) governments, each with its own
parliamentary body. A similar multiparty structure of local and
Land governments existed in the Soviet Occupation Zone but was
increasingly undermined by the ascendance of the Communist
Party. When it became obvious that the Soviet and Western
occupation powers could not agree on how to reconstruct a united
Germany, the Western Allies decided to create their own consolidated West German state. Hence the Allied request that the West
Germans establish a constitutional convention to prepare a
constitution that was to be ratified by a West German plebiscite.
The West Germans were keen on self-government but feared that
the creation of a West German state would block the path to
Germany's future reunification. Instead, they hoped for a provisional governmental structure that would eliminate "the conditions
of disorder and anarchy" that plagued their devastated country, "a
temporary shelter, not more,"2 to enable citizens to lead an ordinary
daily life until the Soviet Occupation Zone would be allowed to join
a free and democratic Germany. In the negotiations over the new
constitution, some of the most fervent disagreements between the
1. I base my description of the inaugural history of the Basic Law on BEWEGT VON DER
HOFFNUNG ALLER DEUTSCHEN: ZUR GESCHICHTE DES GRUNDGESETES, ENTWORFE UND

DISKUSSIONEN 1941-1949 (Wolfgang Benz ed., 1979).
2. Carlo Schmid, Riickblick auf die Verhandlungen, in BEWEGT VON DER HOFFNUNG,
supranote 1, at 503, 508.
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Allied and German representatives concerned semantics. The
Germans objected to the lofty title "constitution." They wanted to
produce "a functional structure serving the tasks of a transition
period"3 and accordingly favored giving the document a humdrum,
administrative-sounding name such as "Grundgesetz"(Basic Law).
They also sought to avoid a democratic legitimization of the new
charter that might raise it to a higher status than they had in mind;
therefore, they rejected a "constitutional convention" in favor of a
"Parliamentary Council" elected by the legislative bodies of the
Lander,and in the end, over strong American objections that almost
led to the collapse of the Allied-German negotiations, succeeded in
convincing the Occupation Powers that the new Basic Law should
not be approved by popular referendum but by the parliaments of
the West German Ldnder.
The authors of the Grundgesetz were no men of the people. Of the
sixty-five delegates to the Parliamentary Council, two-thirds had a
university education,4 over 60 percent were civil servants, 5 and 41
percent were lawyers. 6 There were only four women in the group.
The two large parties--Social Democrats and Christian Democrats
-each had twenty-seven seats; nine votes were held by smaller
bourgeois parties; two delegates were Communists. The drafters'
approach to the work ahead of them was mostly "formed by
bourgeois-liberal conceptions of a constitution."' The debates in the
Parliamentary Council reflected the elevated class background and
education of the members; historical references and literary
quotations were bantered back and forth. Almost three-quarters of
those present had been "professionally disadvantaged" in the Hitler
3. Achte Sitzung des Ausschusses fiir Grundsatzfragen(statement of Carlo Schmid), in
5/1 DER PARLAMENTARISCHE RAT 1948-1949: AKTEN UND PROTOKOLLE 172, 177 (Eberhard

Pikart & Wolfram Werner eds., 1993).
4. Falk Wiesemann, Die Griindungdes Deutschen Weststaats und die Entstehung des
Grundgesetzes, in WESTDEUTSCHLANDS WEG ZUR BUNDESREPUBLIK: 1945-1949: BEITRAGE VON
MITARBEITERN DES INSTITUTS FUR ZEITGESCHICHTE 118, 131 (1976).

5. Theo Stammen & Gerold Maier, DerProzeo der Verfassunggebung, in VORGESCHICHTE
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: ZWISCHEN KAPITULATION UND GRUNDGESETZ 381, 396

(Josef Becker et al. eds., 1979).
6. Wiesemann, supra note 4, at 131.
7. Wolfram Werner, Introduction to 9 DER PARLAMENTARISCHE RAT 1948-1949: AKTEN

UND PROTOKOLLE xv (Rupert Schick & Frederich P. Kahlemberg eds., 1996).
8. Id. at viii.
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years, but prison sentences under the Nazis, except for some of the
Socialists and the two Communists, had been relatively rare. The
architects of the Basic Law were neither activists nor rebels, but
cultivated intellectuals.
Nor did they work on a blank canvas. Even before the Parliamentary Council convened, a group of eleven experts and their staff, the
"Herrenchiemsee Constitutional Convent," had discussed the main
organizing principles of the new constitution and outlined the
Grundgesetz's skeleton. Their suggestions exercised a significant
influence over the design of the final product. The members of the
Herrenchiemsee Convent were appointed by the Land prime
ministers and were selected on the basis of their expertise. All had
at least one doctorate to their names and all were either professors,
high court judges, or highly placed administrators in their respective Land's justice administration. These men-there was no
woman among them-did not see their work as an exercise of
political power but of legal know-how. Above all, they wanted to
avoid what they saw as "the serious structural mistakes" of the
Weimar Constitution,9 and this professional approach was echoed
in the debates of the Parliamentary Council. One of its two Communist delegates would later accuse his bourgeois colleagues of not
having come up "with a single new idea."1 ° The accusation was a bit
unfair, but it reflects the gulf between the two lone activists among
the drafters and their more refined and intellectual bourgeois
colleagues. Both Communist Council members' lives were dominated by their ideology: they had been incarcerated under Hitler,
ran into additional trouble with the authorities of the new West
German Federal Republic, and eventually left to live in the GDR. In
the debates, nobody listened to the Communists. Their surest way
of catching the assembly's attention was by way of catcalls.
The bourgeois majority, meanwhile, set out to design a state that
would give temporary shelter to the new democracy but that would
not foreclose future political choices made by a hopefully reunited
German nation. Despite most members' fear and loathing of the
Soviet model of government ("By tomorrow, the Bolsheviks might be

9. Stammen & Maier, supra note 5, at 399.
10. 9 DER PARLAMENTARISCHE RAT, supra note 7, at 460.
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here," one of the delegates said on one occasion),1 ' the Basic Law
does not rule out large-scale nationalizations of land and industrial
property as long as individual and social interests are "justly
balanced."12 But those tricky issues would be for future legislatures
to decide. For the time being, the provisional character of their work
meant that the drafters of the constitution held on to traditionally
accepted values. The Weimar Constitution's rules on the relations
between church and state, for instance, or on the structure of the
civil service, which seemed to have worked well enough in previous
times, were simply carried over into the Grundgesetz. The inclusion
of "God" into the final version of the Preamble evoked no real
objections. The drafters opted for a "catalogue of classical basic
rights"'3 because those rights, considering Germany's recent
past, now seemed more essential to good governance than ever.
Suggestions to include some social rights, as the Weimar Constitution of 1919 had done by promising help for families with many
children 4 or "the support needed" for people out of work,' 5 popped
up occasionally in the debate but were quickly rejected as only
encouraging "illusions" and "false hopes."' 6 One of the Communists
objected to the short-range time horizon of his bourgeois colleagues:
"One can't design a constitution that is confined by its present
location in time. We must give purpose and direction to the constitution." 7 But the majority decided on "modesty in these matters."'"
In the end, Article 20 of the Basic Law did declare the Federal
Republic to be a "democratic and social state," and this provision, as
we shall see, would take on great significance in the years to come.' 9
But its inclusion in the constitution was something of an accident:
because the definition was neither thought through nor properly
debated, it was accepted by people of very different persuasions and
11. Dritte Sitzung des Ausschusses ffir Grundsatzfragen,in 5/1 DER PARLAMENTARISCHE
RAT, supra note 3, at 28, 58.

12. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 14-15 (F.R.G.).
13. Dritte Sitzung, supra note 11, at 45 (statement of Theodor Heul3, FDP).
14. DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [Weimar Constitution]
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1.] 1383, art. 119, 2 (Weimar Republic).
15. Id. at art. 163, 1 2.
16. Dritte Sitzung, supra note 11, at 39 (statement of Josef Schrage, CDU).
17. Id. at 47 (statement of Hugo Paul, KPD).
18. Id. at 45 (statement of Theodor Heu3, FDP).
19. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 20 (F.R.G.).

1919,
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passed as a vague and formulaic compromise to a problem that the
drafters never properly articulated in the first place.2"
The fathers and few mothers of the Basic Law did not have the
optimism necessary to embark on fundamental social change. The
past weighed on their minds and was often mentioned. "Considering
what we have experienced in the Nazi-years,"2 1 someone might say,
or "I'm thinking of the experiences under Nazi-rule."2 2 Driven by
these experiences, the framers created a powerful system of judicial
review that could successfully defend individual human dignity
against invasions by the state. An early draft of Article 1 of the
Basic Law reversed the fascist adoration of the state: 'The state is
made for man, not man for the state."23 The final version of Article
1 expressed the same conviction in a form better suited to a
catalogue of rights: 'The dignity of man is inviolable."2 4 Knowing
from experience how easily this dignity could be violated nonetheless, the drafters built defenses right into the constitution.
They abolished the death penalty despite the fact that, at the time,
it was still favored by most Germans.2" Under Article 21 of the
Grundgesetz, political parties that misuse their freedoms to
undermine democracy can be outlawed.2 6 If individuals attack the
constitutional order, certain rights can be forfeited.2
But although the makers of the constitution were suspicious of
the government, they did not place much trust in the citizens,
either. Mindful of the ease with which widespread support had been
whipped up for Hitler, they eliminated plebiscites and referenda,
restricting popular input to changes of Land borders.2" 'e must
reckon with the mental laziness of people, the muddy minds, the
moral indifference brought about by Nazi rule," said Theodor Heu3,

20. Ernst Benda, Der Soziale Rechtsstaat, in 1 HANDBUCH DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 507, 510 (Ernst Benda et al. eds., 1995).
21. Dritte Sitzung, supra note 11, at 52.
22. Id. at 50.
23. 2 DER PARLAMENTARISCHE RAT 1948-1949: AKTEN UND PROTOKOLLE 217 (Kurt G.
Wernicke & Hans Booms eds., 1981).
24. GRUNDGESETZ [GG art. 1.
25. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
26. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 21, 2 (F.R.G.).
27. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 18 (F.R.G.).
28. Id. at art. 29.
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the future President of the Republic.2 9 And one of his colleagues
from the Christian Democrats warned: "I don't see a lot of confidence [among us] that the German people will defend its democratic
freedoms. If we want to remain level-headed, we should not place
exaggerated hopes on the people." 30 Accordingly, the Basic Law
decided on a representative democracy in which members of
parliament did not function as an immediate mouthpiece of the
people, but rather as go-betweens who could use the power bestowed
upon them by the electorate according to the dictates of their own
conscience. The drafters also thought that the Grundgesetz might
have to educate the citizenry: "It is the great task of our generation
to wean the Germans of the habits of cheap nationalism."3 '
Given the Parliamentary Council's preoccupation with the past,
Germany's responsibility for the horrors of this past had to be on the
members' minds. The issue was debated at great length, and proved
difficult to handle. Initially, the "Committee for Basic Principles"
had intended to preface the constitution with a short historical
narrative that would articulate a rejection of the past. 'The
national-socialist tyranny has robbed the nation of its freedom. War
32
and violence have plunged humanity into misery and destitution"
were to be the first two sentences of this introduction. Actually, the
drafters used the old fashioned word "Zwingherrschaft"rather than
the modern "Zwangsherrschaft"or "Tyrannei," suggesting an almost
medieval control of an invader over a suppressed population.
Ludwig Bergstriisser, a Social Democrat, objected: "Zwingherrschaft
denotes a power coming from the outside. National Socialism has
not come from outside but from within." 3 But Carlo Schmid, the
most prominent Social Democrat on the Committee, rejected
Bergstrdsser's interpretation. The term was meant to say that,
"[W]e're talking about domination not based on legitimate authority.
We Germans, too, were the victims of National Socialism; even the
first. 34 In the end, the idea of a historical introduction to the
29. Dritte Sitzung, supra note 11, at 45.

30. Achte Sitzung, supra note 3, at 189 (statement of Gerhard Kroll).
31. Id. at 184 (statement of Theodor HeuB, FDP).
32. Neunte Sitzung des Ausschusses ffir Grundsatzfragen,in 5/I DER PARLAMENTARISCHE
RAT, supranote 3, at 226, 230.
33. Id. at 238.
34. Id.
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constitution was dropped. The Basic Law's Preamble begins, "Aware
of its responsibility before God' and men," but does not specify how
that responsibility had been forsaken in the past. Still, without that
past, the Parliamentary Council's Constitution would have looked
very different.
B. During the making of the first East German Constitution of
1949, the past seemed absent.3 5 Considering that the constitution
was drafted under the leadership of a party bent on transforming
not just its own society but eventually the world, that may come as
no surprise. Moreover, East German Communists, having themselves been victims of the Nazis, did not consider their part of
Germany to be accountable for Hitler's atrocities. That was the
responsibility of the West German side. The two men who exerted
most influence on the East German constitution's text, First
Communist Party Secretary Walter Ulbricht and his most trusted
legal expert Karl Polak, had both emigrated to the Soviet Union
during the Nazi years and, steeped in Stalinist ideology, had
returned to a Soviet Occupation Zone in ruins with the intention of
resolving German problems by the application of Soviet solutions.
Already in April 1946, their Communist Party, the KPD, had
merged with the Social Democratic Party (SPD)-according to East
Germans, to overcome the fatal schism that had debilitated socialist
opposition to the Nazis; according to West Germans, under considerr
able Soviet pressure. Both descriptions had some truth to them. In
any event, the new Socialist Unity Party (SED) was clearly controlled by the Communists and steered the constitutional deliberations.
But the East German Communists were not the only group whose
input shaped the GDR Constitution of 1949. The Soviet Union held
on to hopes for a united Germany longer than the Western Allies did
and therefore was more reluctant to authorize the drafting of a
constitution for its Occupation Zone than the Western powers had
been for what the Germans then called '"Trizonesia." Instead, the
Russians tried to push for a constitution for a united Germany. To
make that constitution palatable to the West, the Soviet Occupation
35. My account of the East German constitution-drafting process is based on HEIKE AMOS,
DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER VERFASSUNG IN DER SOWJETISCHEN BESATZUNGSZONE/DDR 1946-1949:
DARSTELLUNG UND DOKUMENTATION (2006).
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Powers encouraged the creation of a series of popular assemblies
called "People's Congresses for Unity and a Just Peace" that would
include delegates from the Western Occupation Zones and that, by
way of a "People's Council" composed of members of the "Congress,"
would prepare a draft constitution for a united Germany. The first
"People's Congress," convened in December 1947, was based on an
"opaque ' 3 selection protocol. Members were nominated both by
political parties and other social groupings (the Western members
mainly by the West German branch of the Communist Party); and
in the end, East German SED and West German KPD deputies
together made up 72 percent of the roughly 2000 delegates. The
second "People's Congress" of 1948 elected a "People's Council" of
400 members, 100 of them from the West, which in March 1948
(three months before the Western Allies initiated the process that
would lead to the creation of the Grundgesetz), appointed a
"Constitutional Committee" to design an all-German constitution.
Again, nine of the thirty members of the "Constitutional Committee"
were West Germans. But the West Germans never played a role in
any of these various assemblies. As early as 1947, the Western
Allies had outlawed West German participation in political endeavors in the Soviet Occupation Zone; the Cold War was on the horizon;
on June 24, 1948, the Berlin Blockade began, and by the time the
Constitutional Committee completed its final draft of the East
German Constitution, the names of its West German members were
left unpublished because their participation in the enterprise could
be punished under West German criminal law.3"
Nevertheless, throughout the entire period of their constitutionmaking efforts, the East Germans maintained their interest in West
German collaboration. The Soviets hoped for, and steered the East
German authorities towards, a compromise constitution that might
prevent the permanent division of Germany, and the East Germans
seem to have shared their views. It is a bit mysterious where they
found the encouragement to cling to their belief that constitutional
cooperation between East and West Germany might actually be
possible. The Parliamentary Council was profoundly hostile to what
happened in the Soviet Occupation Zone. "Despite the pigsty in the
36. Id. at 133.
37. Id. at 139.
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East, we must have the same flag," Theodor HeuB3 said, for instance,
to defend the West German choice of the colors black, red, and
gold. 3' But for their part, the East Germans followed attentively the
constitutional deliberations in the West. Otto Grotewohl, the Chair
of the Constitutional Committee-then chief SED-functionary but
prior to the fusion of both socialist parties, head of the East German
SPD-was convinced that his committee's draft could serve as an
acceptable compromise to both Germanies."9 As late as March 21,
1949-a month before the ratification of the Basic Law-the
Presidium of the Third East German People's Council wrote to
Konrad Adenauer, the President of the Parliamentary Council and
future first Chancellor of the Federal Republic, to suggest an
East/West German meeting to discuss a common policy. 40 Only a
week after the passage of the Grundgesetz did the East Germans
initiate the ratification process of their own constitution. It was
approved unanimously on October 7, 1949, by the "People's Council,"
which at the same time turned itself into the first East German
parliament, the "People's Chamber."
The 1949 East German Constitution was even less legitimated by
popular support than the West German Grundgesetz. The West
German members of the Parliamentary Council had been delegated
by the political parties at Land level but at least two-thirds of them
had been members of their respective parliaments 4 ' and thus, at
some point, had been elected by the citizens. The various "People's
Congresses" and the bodies emerging from their midst were
essentially co-opted by the SED, which at all times made sure that
it controlled the majority of the votes. Twelve of the twenty-one East
German members of the Constitutional Committee (we can forget
about the nine absent members from West Germany) thus were
members of the SED. 42 Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see the
Committee's product simply as the result of Communist manipulation and deceit. For one thing, even the Communists intended a
compromise with the West Germans. On many of the issues at
38. Wolfram Werner, Introduction to 5/I DER PARLAMENTARISCHE RAT, supra note 3, at

xlix.
39.
40.
41.
42.

AMOS, supra note 35, at 235.
Id. at 294.
Stammen & Maier, supra note 5, at 395.
AMOS, supra note 35, at 145.
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stake, the nine bourgeois members of the Constitutional Committee
ought to have been able to find support from the former Social
Democrats among the SED members on the committee. The Chair
himself was a former Social Democrat willing to engage in negotiations and offer concessions. The discussions in the Committee
always were settled by a vote, which, though often unanimous, at
this stage of East German history still allowed for disagreement and
dissent. Objections could be and were raised in crucial matters: the
relations between church and state,4 3 the legitimacy of private
schools," even separation of powers questions.4 5 The Communists
did not win every battle. This was not a homogenous group: ardent
Stalinists, fellow travelers, and future opponents of the system
worked together. Only a few years after the founding of the German
Democratic Republic, two of the drafters were arrested for political
reasons, two were demoted, and one fled to West Germany.4 6 Maybe
more importantly, most of the Committee members were trained
lawyers who had been socialized under a bourgeois legal system. We
thus can read the first East German Constitution as a document
reflecting more or less authentically the values and beliefs of all of
those who drafted it. But, apart from the absurdly optimistic hopes
that the West Germans would be willing to cooperate with their
colleagues from the East, what were those beliefs?
The 1949 East German Constitution is a strangely mixed bag. It
contains a number of provisions that would not have looked out of
place in a bourgeois constitution. Article 24 speaks of property in
words that seem to have been copied from the Weimar Constitution
and the Grundgesetz;47 Article 138 announces administrative courts
4
to protect a citizen against illegal decisions of the administration;
the rules on the separation of church and state not only promise
"full freedom of belief and conscience" to every citizen, but even
43. Id. at 287.
44. Id. at 243.
45. Id.

46. See the short biographies of some Committee members in Amos, id. at 232-56.
47. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK (1949) [Constitution]

art. 24,

1 (G.D.R.) ("Property obligates. Its use must not run counter to the social weal.");

cf. DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS (1919) art. 153,
3 (Weimar Republic);
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 14, 2 (F.R.G.).
48. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK (1949) art. 138, 1

(G.D.R.).
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grant the church the right to speak up on political issues and, in the
German tradition, to use the state tax system to collect its members'
contributions; 49 and Article 49, like the Basic Law, seems to protect
the "essential content" of a basic right even in those cases in which
the Constitution allows it to be limited by ordinary law.5 ° Provisions
like these might have served to assuage the more conservative
committee members.
But the bourgeois members of the Constitutional Committee did
not seem all that worried in the first place. The political mood in the
Committee must have been different from that in the Parliamentary
Council. Heike Amos, whose thorough account of the 1949 East
German constitution-making process is based on records of the
proceedings that became available after 1989, does not report any
debates about the past amongst its members. The drafting of the
Preamble, for example, which had caused such soul searching in
Bonn, proceeded in East Berlin without discernible debate and
produced a few uncontested lines largely copied from the preamble
of the Weimar Constitution. Whereas the Parliamentary Council's
memories of the Nazi years, like Banquo's ghost, were always
present at the table, the East German Constitutional Committee
seemed unconcerned about such apparitions. The name Hitler was
almost never mentioned. The burdens of history were other people's
business. As far as Socialism was concerned, they should be
jettisoned. The East German drafters behaved like people writing
on a clean slate. Some concessions to the past might prove useful to
comfort those unnerved by too rapid change. But the past was
essentially disposable. Side by side with its bourgeois bits, the
constitution contained radical rejections of German government
traditions. Had the civil service not served the Nazis with the same
conscientiousness as previously the Weimar Republic and the
Kaiser? Abolish it! Had German judges, appointed for life by a
judicial bureaucracy, in any way resisted the perversion of the law?
Let the future judiciary be elected by the people! Were private
schools not breeding grounds for class division? Replace them by
universal public education!
49. Id. at art. 41, 1 ("Every citizen enjoys the full freedom of belief and conscience."); id.
at art. 43, 4 (right to use tax system).
50. Id. at art. 49.
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The drafters' readiness to deviate from previous solutions makes
the East German Constitution's stance appear more forceful and
more daring than that of the Grundgesetz. For instance, the
Parliamentary Council had been hesitant and nervous about
granting equal rights to men and women and about assimilating the
positions of children born within and outside of marriage. The
fathers of the West German constitution (and even three of its four
mothers) worried that an equal rights provision would invalidate too
many of the family law provisions of the Civil Code. There were
repeated reminders that women, after all, have different tasks in
life than men and that equality in marriage must be compatible
with "the natural functions of the sexes."'" "One must tell [West
German] women that [the more comprehensive notions of equality
advocated] in the East exist only on paper,"" said a Christian
Democrat in the debate. In the end, the Grundgesetz included a
provision on the equal rights of men and women but delayed its
application until March 31, 1953, to give the legislature time to
adapt conflicting legislation.53 When that deadline passed without
a new egalitarian family law in sight, the ordinary courts had to
decide themselves how to undo the many statutory inequalities
between men and women. One court of appeals refused to do so
because, absent a legislative guideline, the enforcement of equal
rights through unpredictable and haphazard case law would violate
the higher-ranking constitutional principle of 'legal security."54 The
constitutional deadline had been clear enough, but it took a
Constitutional Court decision to declare Article 3, Paragraph 2 of
the Basic Law to be directly applicable law even if it should result
in possible confusion and disorder.5 Only four years later did the
Federal Parliament finally pass a new family law statute that
corrected the previously unequal legislative treatment of men and
51. Vierundzwanzigste Sitzung des Ausschusses ffir Grundsatzfragen, in

5/Il DER

PARLAMENTARISCHE RAT 1948-1949: ARTEN UND PROTOKOLLE 621, 643 (Eberhard Pikart &
Wolfram Werner eds., 1993).
52. Siebenundzwanzigste Sitzung des Ausschusses far Grundsatzfragen, in 5/II DER
PARLAMENTARISCHE RAT, supra note 51, at 771, 778.
53. GRUNDGESETZ 2 [GG] art. 3, 2 and art. 117, 1 (F.R.G.).
54. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court], Dec. 18, 1953, 3
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 225 (F.R.G.) (citing OLG
Frankfurt (court of appeals)).
55. Id.
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women.5" The constitution's promise of equal rights for children born
within and outside of marriage, which had not included a deadline
for the legislature,5 7 fared even worse. It was fulfilled only twenty
years after the constitution's ratification when the Constitutional
Court finally lost patience8 and put an end to Parliament's dragging
its feet.5 9
The example is meant to show how difficult it is to change the
world for people who feel indebted to the past, and how easy change
looks to people who do not. The East Germans' legislative insouciance produced ironic results. Article 10, Paragraph 3 of the 1949
GDR Constitution, for instance, protected the right to emigrate-a
right whose inclusion in the Grundgesetzthe Parliamentary Council
had debated and rejected because it might be too difficult to honor
such a right in a devastated land that needed its able-bodied
workers to stay home.6" Eight years later, the GDR passed its first
statute penalizing "flight from the Republic."61 But at the time of the
constitution's birth, its drafters seemed unconcerned with what the
country could or could not afford. The constitution's list of social
rights-to work, to vacation, to healthcare, to housing (in a world
that lay in rubble), even the right to strike-were easily accepted in
the Committee.6 2 Populist provisions from the Weimar years that
allowed the electorate to have an immediate input into legislation,
and that the makers of the Basic Law, suspicious of the voters, had
rejected, also found a place in the East German Constitution. 63 It
was supposed to be an inclusive document. Hence, for example, the
56. Gleichberechtigungsgesetz [Equal Rights Law], June 18,1957, BGBl. I at 609 (F.R.G.).
57. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 6, 5 (F.R.G.).
58. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court], Jan. 29, 1969, 25
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 167 (F.R.G.).
59. The remedial law was finally passed in August 1969. See Gesetz uber die rechtliche
Stellung der nichtehelichen Kinder [Law on the Legal Standing of Non-marital Children],
Aug. 19, 1969, BGB1. I at 1243 (F.R.G.).
60. Fiinfte Sitzung des Ausschusses fir

Grundsatzfragen,in 5/I DER PARLAMENTARISCHE

RAT, supra note 3, at 88, 105.
61. Gesetz zur Anderung des Passgesetzes, Dec. 11, 1957, Gesetzblatt der DDR
[hereinafter GBI. GDR] I at 650.
1
62. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK (1949) art. 15,
(right to work); art. 16, 1 (right to vacation); art. 16, 3 (right to preservation of health); art.
26, 2 (right to housing); art. 14, 2 (right to strike) (G.D.R.).
63. See id. at art. 87 on the Volksentscheid (popular decision) and Volksbegehren (popular
legislative initiative).
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rules that not just political parties but also social organizations such
as unions or the "Democratic League of Women" could nominate
candidates for parliament6 4 and that the government would not be
run exclusively by the party garnering most votes, but would
include, popular-front style, in a united "Block" all parties and
organizations with more than forty deputies in the "People's
Chamber.""
The wide-ranging support that such blurry rules found in the
Constitutional Committee is surprising. After all, most of its
important members were traditionally trained lawyers. But their
professional instincts-preciseness, caution, doubt, and skeptical
reserve-seemed lost in the excitement of creating a better
world. Why was the rule that the constitutionality of legislation
should be reviewed not by the courts but by the legislature's own
"Constitutional Commission"66 not even properly debated by the
drafters?"7 Why did the Christian Democrats on the Committee, at
whose insistence the constitution introduced a two-chamber system,
with the upper house, the Ldnderkammer, representing the then
existing five East German states, celebrate the creation of the Landchamber as a major victory and did not notice that it was assigned
no political authority to speak of?68 Why would Karl Schultes, one
of the most influential men on the Committee, who in December
1950 fled to West Berlin and would eventually serve as a Justice on
the Constitutional Court of West Germany's Nordrhein-Westfalen
for twelve years, himself design the constitution's infamous Article
6, which penalized the "incitement to boycott democratic institutions" as a "felony in the meaning of the Criminal Code,"6 9 thus
turning the constitution from a shield defending citizens against
invasions by the state into a bludgeon of the state to subdue its
citizens?
Because-I am suggesting-he did not think of the constitution
as a legal document but as a design for a better world. In the early
post-war years, the longing for this world, the belief that it might be
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at art. 13, 1.
Id. at art. 92.
Id. at arts. 66, 89.
AMOS, supranote 35, at 223.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 203.
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feasible, and the willingness to apply drastic measures should they
be required to create it, were not confined to the Soviet Occupation
Zone. While the Parliamentary Council responded to the trauma of
the Hitler years with introspection and professional caution, other
West Germans were shaken into temporary political activism.
Socialism seemed to provide some of the answers they were looking
for. In several big cities in the Western Zones, "Antifascist Committees" looking for radical political renewal and composed mainly of
Communists and Social Democrats sprang up, and quickly wilted,
under the pressure of the Western Military Governments." My own
father, as mild-mannered and non-political a man as one can
imagine, joined the Social Democratic Party. In March 1946, one
month before the merger of the Communist and Social Democratic
Parties in the Soviet Occupation Zone, a third of all members of the
SPD in the American Zone were willing to support the East German
"Unity Party" that was about to be created; 1 62.1 percent were
willing to cooperate with the Communists.7 2
The Western Allies, for whom a sound and democratic West
German state represented "a cornerstone in their calculus of anticommunist containment," 3 had to be worried about such leftist
stirrings. When Article 41 of the 1946 Constitution of Hesse, one of
the Ldnder in the American Zone, provided for the immediate
nationalization of all coal mines, the iron and steel industry, the
energy industry, and all rail traffic, 4 General Clay, the military
governor, permitted its inclusion only under the condition that it
would be submitted to the Hessian people in a separate vote. When
71.9 percent of the electorate approved of their state's socialization
plans, General Clay allowed Article 41 to remain in the constitution's text but suspended its execution. 5 He hoped that the political
70. Giinter Plum, Versuche gesellschaftspolitischer Neuordnung: Ihr Scheitern im
Krdftefeld deutscherund alliierterPolitik, in WESTDEUTSCHLANDS WEGzUR BUNDESREPUBLIK:
1945-1949, supra note 4, at 90, 92.
71. PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY: THE OMGUS SURVEYS, 1945-1949, at 71
(Anna J. Merritt & Richard L. Merritt eds., 1970).
72. ALBRECHT KADEN, EINHEIT ODER FREIHEIT: DIE WIEDERGRUNDUNG DER SPD 1945/46,
at 256 (1964).
73. Wiesemann, supranote 4, at 119.
74. For the Hessian socialization plans, see Gerd Winter, Sozialisierungin Hessen 194655, 7 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 157 (1974).
75. Plum, supra note 70, at 112-13.
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and economic recovery of their country would cure West Germans
of their radical leanings: 'Time is on our side."7 6 And so it was.
Article 41 of the Hesse Constitution was never carried out.77
But in the Soviet Occupation Zone, the Military Government's
strategic goal of a united Germany open to Soviet influence and the
East German Constitutional Committee's blurry and contradictory
plans for a socially just and harmonious state fed into each other.
Heike Amos, in her account of the 1949 Constitution's genesis,
attributes all its inconsistencies and failings to the cunning of the
SED, which, under the camouflage of liberal concessions, aimed for
a document that would facilitate the transformation of East
Germany into a vassal of the Soviet Union.7 8 Subsequent events
seem to support this view. Nevertheless, it strikes me as one-sided.
If they were duped, the bourgeois members of the Constitutional
Committee were duped so easily because they, too, believed in the
possibility of political renewal. One of them, a politically nonaligned
professor of medicine, would later write in his autobiography: "One
of my most cherished memories is of my work in the Constitutional
Committee led by Otto Grothewohl.... The most judicious and
politically knowledgeable heads contributed to this committee."79
For him, as for all committee members, the first constitution of the
GDR was a product of hope.
C. So was the East German Roundtable Constitutional draft of
1990. But because the Berlin Wall collapsed so suddenly and
unexpectedly, and because events that followed proceeded at such
breakneck speed, the drafting was begun and completed in a mere
four months, and the hope that fueled the hectic work looked
feverish at first and, at the end, had to be sustained by a stubborn
denial of the political developments. Later, a West German critic
would accuse East German constitution drafters of fostering
"hallucinations of happiness."8 But in the first weeks after the
miraculous events of November 9, 1989, when their work began,
76. JOHN GIMBEL, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF GERMANY: POLITICS AND THE MILITARY,
1945-1949, at 170 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).

77. Winter, supra note 74, at 164.
78. See generally AMOS, supra note 35.
79. Id. at 253 n.654 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Detlef Merten,
Verfassungspatriotismus und Verfassungsschwdrmerei,
VERWALTUNGS ARCHlv 283, 295 (1992).

83
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everything seemed possible. The socialist government of the SED
was rapidly disintegrating."1 Spontaneous roundtable discussions
sprang up throughout East Germany: meetings of civic-minded
citizens, dissenters, local officials, and ordinary citizens who got
together to debate how the political energy exploding all around
them could be funneled into the creation of a democratic GDR. The
motto of the masses demonstrating in the streets-Wir sind das
Volk!" 2 -claimed its power for the people.
The Central Roundtable of the GDR 3 was established on
December 7, 1989, and, like the regional roundtables, was composed
of representatives of the "old" and the "new" political forces: fifteen
members delegated by the various political opposition groups,
which, in most cases quite recently, had been established in the
GDR; another fifteen deputies from the political parties in the
People's Chamber. Each side was aided by fifteen advisers who had
no right to vote in the proceedings. Especially among the "new"
political forces, few were lawyers-a group whose members in the
days of socialism had been unlikely to be vocal critics of the
government-and few came from occupations in which money
played an important role, such as economists or managers.
Instead, the representatives of political dissent came from the
caring professions or at least from professions unaligned with
political authority: theology, medicine, teaching, and the arts. The
roundtable discussions were hosted by the church, which provided
rooms and moderators and contributed significantly to the "peacefulness" of the proceedings.' From the outset, some members of the
"old" group crossed over to the "new" side, which therefore early on
could count on five additional votes beyond its own sixteen.8 5 The
Roundtable was also treated with respect by the new East German
government which, faced with its own disintegration, needed the
81. For a description of the events following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, see PETER E.
QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION (1997)
and Paul M. Schwartz, ConstitutionalChangeand ConstitutionalLegitimation:The Example
of German Unification, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1027 (1994).
82. 'We are the people!" See Schwartz, supra note 81, at 1036.
83. On the history of the Central Roundtable of the GDR, see generally UWE THAYSEN,
DER RUNDE TISCH, ODER: Wo BLIEB DAS VOLK? DER WEG DER DDR IN DIE DEMOKRATIE (1990).
84. Id. at 36.
85. Id. at 42.
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dissenters' advice and help to maintain law and order and to
transform a universally despised Party state into a state acceptable
to its own people. Between the Wall's collapse and the first free
elections in the GDR in March 1990, about 2000 East Germans
moved daily to the Federal Republic.8' Those in authority hoped that
the Roundtable might help stop the exodus by lending legitimacy to
the political process in East Germany. The new Prime Minister
Modrow himself paid a visit to the Roundtable deliberations to
confer with the reformers. By mid-January 1990, it became obvious
that the Roundtable had progressed from its position of "trailblazer
of liberation" to being "a central political steering power" in the
GDR.87
The Roundtable's first decision after convening around its,
incidentally, rectangular table, was to charge a subcommittee with
drafting a new constitution for the GDR. The Commission was
composed of representatives of the dissenters' groups88 and members
of the East German People's Chamber and again, few were lawyers.
But it was assisted by a mixed East/West German group of constitutional experts-six East German law professors, four highly
respected liberal West German legal academics, a former justice
of West Germany's Constitutional Court-and was willing to look
for inspiration wherever it could be found. East Germany's best
known writer, Christa Wolf, for instance, wrote the constitution's
Preamble.8 9 No minutes exist of the Drafting Commission's work:
there was no bureaucratic framework or experience, no time, and
probably no money to hire stenographers. But the discussions of the
Central Roundtable itself are published, thanks to the foresight and
energy of a West German political scientist who observed all
meetings and later reconstructed the proceedings with the help of
audio tapes and television recordings of the meetings that, in the
heyday of post-Wall enthusiasm, were aired live in the GDR.9"
86. Christian Starck, Deutschland auf dem Wege zur staatlichen Einheit, 45 JURISTEN
ZEITUNG 349, 351 (1990).
87. THAYSEN, supra note 83, at 82.

88. Such as the "New Forum," the "Initiative Peace and Human Rights," and "Democracy
Now," for example.
89. QUINT, supra note 81, at 30.
90. See generally DER ZENTRALE RUNDE TISCH DER DDR: WORTPROTOKOLL UND
DOKUMENTE (Uwe Thaysen ed., 2000).
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The constitutional subcommittee's work took place in the light of
these discussions; the draft reflects the optimism of people who
believe that they have just achieved a peaceful revolution. Their
constitution was meant to preserve the gains of this revolution
or-as the Preamble puts it--of the "revolutionary renewal" of their
country. Like the Grundgesetz, the Roundtable Draft was not
intended to be permanent. In 1949, Article 146 of the Basic Law had
limited its validity to the day when the German people would be
able "in a free decision" to create a new constitution for a united
Germany. 9 Four decades later, Article 136 of the Roundtable Draft
expressed similar hopes for a new German constitution created by
an "all-German constitutional assembly."9 2 The hopes were not the
hopes of realists. Already in the spring of 1990, it seemed quite
possible that Germany's reunification would not happen by a coming
together of two independent German states under Article 146, but
rather by simple accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic
under Article 23 of the Basic Law-a method used once before in
1956 when French-occupied Saarlandjoined the FRG.9 3 The Draft
wanted to make sure that even this second-best reunification would
respect the newly won self-determination of the people. Even an
accession, Article 132 of the Draft insisted, required a popular vote
by all East Germans.9 4 The drafters wanted their new East German
democracy to find its feet, articulate its own values, and contribute
on an even footing to the makeup of a future united Germany. Both
the Committee members who were coming from the new civic
groupings of dissenters (Biirgerbewegungen)and those who were
Party-people from the days of socialism were proud of their national
identity. Both groups felt that East German citizens were ready to
rule themselves. According to Article 43 of the Draft, the flag of
their reborn country would show the colors black, red, and gold, in
the German national tradition, and carry the motto "Swords into
Plowshares," the peace cry of many of the Protestant dissenters

91. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 146 (F.R.G.).
92. Verfassungsentwurf des Runden Tisches [Roundtable Draft] art. 136, available at
http://glasnost.de/verfass/9004verfass.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
93. Gesetz diber die Eingliederung des Saarlandes [Law on the Integration of Saarland],
Dec. 23, 1956, BGB1. I at 1011 (F.R.G.).
94. Verfassungsentwurf des Runden Tisches, supra note 92, at art. 132.
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under socialism.9" The Roundtable Draft embodies the moral choices
of well-intentioned people trying to create a well-intentioned state.
At least-so the East German hopes at the time-it would leave its
imprint on a future all-German constitutional debate.
The Draft thus had two defining purposes: to distance itself from
an undesirable past and to put down markers for a better future. Its
attitude to the West German Basic Law is ambivalent. On the one
hand, the Grundgesetz is the great model of the drafters: its
Constitutional Court, its system of government tort liability, its
judicial enforcement of basic rights, its notion of an "essential
content" of those rights that may not be invaded by the state,96 and
its commitment to the "eternal" validity of some rights that may not
even be altered by constitutional amendment,9" are all borrowed
from the Basic Law, sometimes verbatim. But the drafters are also
critical of some capitalist freedoms that in their view go too far. The
Draft's protection of free speech does not extend to war propaganda
and public discriminatory talk violating human dignity.9" Private
television may not threaten the "multiplicity" of television programs
contributing to public information.9 9 Research involving certain,
unnamed risks may require prior notice to the state. °° The outlawing of political parties hostile to the constitution (a task of the
Constitutional Court both under the Grundgesetz and the
Roundtable Draft) does not affect the civic rights of the outlawed
party's followers,"' a rule in direct response to the unfortunate
consequences of the West German outlawing of the Communist
Party in 1956, which led to a political witch hunt of former party
members during the Cold War.
And the Roundtable Draft wants to surpass the Grundgesetz by
moving towards a more participatory, more culturally diverse, more
inclusive, and more tolerant democracy. It eliminates not just the
death penalty but also life long prison sentences,0 2 expressly
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at art. 43.
at art. 40,
at art. 100,
at art. 15,
at art. 15,
at art. 19,
at art. 37,
at art. 12,

2.

1 2.
3.
4.
2.
4.
5.
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constitutionalizes the right to abortion,10 3 protects long-term
cohabitation alongside with marriage, 104 introduces voting rights for
foreigners,0 5 and postulates gradually increasing rights for
children.' 6 It encourages civic participation in ways that surpass
the cautious representative democracy of the Basic Law. The Draft
allows for popular legislation by way of a Volksentscheid,10 7 grants
all residents-not just citizens-a right to participate in discussions
of public-building undertakings that affect their rights and interests, 108 or to obtain data on potential environmental hazards to one's
'life sphere,"'0 9 and gives the legislature the right to dissolve itself"0
and to remove cabinet members by way of no-confidence votes.''
The civic groupings of citizens (Biirgerbewegungen)that sprang up
during the last chaotic years of the GDR and that were the political
home of most dissenter-members at the table are honored with their
own constitutional provision
and given access to official information
12
that concerns their work."
Add to this the apparent socialist carryovers in the constitution
and you can see why many West German observers viewed it
with suspicion. Provisions like the prohibitions of censorship,1 3 of
humiliating punishment, or of nonconsensual medical experimentation"' show that the drafters were afraid of the perversions of
government power. Not afraid enough, however, to reject the notion
of a benevolent and solicitous state. The Roundtable Draft grants
the state an important role in caring for citizens' welfare and
promoting social justice, and assumes that invasions of private
property will be needed to achieve those goals. Quite in the socialist
tradition, the Roundtable members seem to disapprove of private
accumulations of large wealth and honor property not primarily as
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

art. 4,
art. 22,
art. 21,
art. 22,
art. 89.
art. 21,
art. 33,
art. 55,
art. 77,
art. 35.
art. 15,
art. 4,

3.
2.
2.
9 4, 5.
4.
3.
3.
9 2.
9 5.
2.

2008] CONSTITUTION MAKING AFTER NATIONAL CATASTROPHES 1329
an instrument of entrepreneurial energy but as a means of satisfying individual needs. Property that is "personally used" and pension
claims based on individual work "enjoy the special protection of the
Constitution.""' 5 If land greatly increases in value due to a change
in public land-use rules, however, the owner must split his gains
with the state." 6 Unearned income appears suspicious. Nor should
ownership convey too much power over others. The Roundtable
Constitution affirms both the far-reaching Soviet expropriations of
large private land holdings after the war-which had broken the
patronage of the Prussian aristocracy-and all post-1949, mostly
economically motivated, nationalizations based on GDR legislation
even in those cases in which the transfer was never properly
recorded in the public registers. Only owners who lost their property
in violation of then-existing socialist law are to receive restitution." '
Future nationalizations entitle an owner to full compensation only
if he personally used the expropriated object."' And land ownership
of more than one hundred hectares is reserved to public or social
institutions and the churches" 9-a rule that at the time the Draft
was written required no dispossessions because large private land
ownership had ceased to exist in the GDR.
The Roundtable drafters did not much care for "old" property. But
they showed great concern for citizens' "new property": for benefits
derived from work such as wages, pensions, or vacations, or from
the government's solicitous response to people's needs. Like its
socialist predecessor, the GDR Roundtable Draft protects the rights
to social security, to work, to housing, to education, and to
healthcare. 2 ° These rights were carefully drafted to exclude direct
claims against the state and limit the right to sue the state to
certain "cases of special need."'' To give the constitutional promises
some legal weight, the Draft instead introduces a number of state
goals-such as the state's obligation "as a rule, to pursue an
economic policy that grants precedence to the goal of full employ115. Id. at art. 29,
116. Id. at art. 32,
117. Id. at art. 31.
118. Id. at art. 29,
119. Id. at art. 32,
120. Id. at art. 23,

2.
2.
3.
1.
2; art. 24,

121. See id. at art. 23,

1; art. 27,

1.

2 (establishing the right to social security).
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ment"12 2-- or "institutional guarantees"-such as a "public law
insurance system"'12 3 providing help in sickness or old age. 2 4 Again,
the "state goals" and "institutional guarantees" are reminiscent of
socialist constitutions, which tended to include long lists of promises
supposedly ensured by the specific structures of the socialist state.
The socialist sovereign, of course, could not be sued. In this respect,
the Roundtable's image of the state profoundly differs from that of
its predecessor: the government can be sued by its citizens, a
carefully structured judicial system stands ready to adjudicate their

claims and to tackle even constitutional issues, and the Draft
expressly declares that "the human and civic rights of this constitution bind the legislature, the executive, the courts, and, to the extent
that the constitution so provides, other citizens."'25
But how should judges interpret the various constitutional
guidelines obligating the state to "aim for,"'26 "secure,"'27 "safeguard,"' 28 or otherwise ensure respect for a citizen's basic rights and
needs? Do the different wordings in the various provisions imply
different degrees of constitutional protection? How can such terms
constrain future interpreters? Does a provision stating that
"everyone is entitled to respect for his personality and privacy"'29
also bind a person's fellow citizens? And, if so, what happened to the
public/private distinction? West German observers worried about
the Roundtable Draft's unjuridic phraseology, its excess of optimism, its socialist leanings, and its suggestion that even if
the-improved-Basic Law should remain the constitution of a
united Germany, it should be subjected to an East German plebiscite. Legal bureaucrats in Bonn shook their heads over the Draft's
ambitions. The FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung called it an "unhatched cuckoo's egg."'"3 A conservative critic accused it of having
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at art. 27, 3.
Id. at art. 23, 3.
Id.
Id. at art. 40, 1.
Id. at art. 3 (referring to the equal rights of men and women).
Id. at art. 15 (relating to media regulations).
Id. at art. 33 (relating to environmental protection).
Id. at art. 8, 1.
Peter Haberle, DerEntwurfderArbeitsgruppe"Neue VerfassungderDDR"des Runden
Tisches (1990), in 39 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART 319, 325 (Peter
Hdberle ed., 1990).
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been nourished by "emancipatory theories of cultural revolution,
simple philanthropy, distrust of the nation state, cosmopolitanism,
the ideology of multiculturalism, democratization efforts, socialism,
pacifism, ecologism, feminism, and the rejection of traditional
institutions such as marriage, the civil service, and the traditional
relationship of church and state."''
On April 5, 1990, less than three weeks after the first free
elections in the GDR, the Roundtable drafting committee handed
over its work to the newly constituted People's Chamber. The
Roundtable itself had already been dissolved because a democratically elected legislature now stood ready to represent the people. In
a letter to each deputy, the drafters expressed the hope that their
efforts would influence the future constitutional debate in the GDR.
How long that GDR would still exist was questionable.
II. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CONSTITUTIONS?
A. The Roundtable Draft fared worst. It was debated in the
People's Chamber only in passing, in a parliamentary Question
Hour, when most speakers expressed the fear that the Draft would
prove to be a hurdle to reunification.' 3 2 The delegates decided not
even to transfer it to the competent committee. They seemed uninterested in the issues of political ethics that the Draft articulated.
Under socialism, the political and cultural identity of the GDR and
the particular brand of left-wing, good-willed optimism that the
Roundtable Draft had tried to put into constitutional form had been
born of the experience of a people forced to look inward, rather than
outward, at the world, and had been held together by the Wall."3
Now that the Wall had fallen and dissent was cheap, it became
irrelevant. The March 1990 elections had fundamentally changed
the political composition of the legislature.'
Chancellor Kohl's
Christian Democrats-who advocated the rapid accession of the
131. Josef Isensee, Mit blauem Auge davongekommen-das Grundgesetz, 46 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 2583, 2584 (1993).
132. Haberle, supranote 130, at 323.
133. See Bernhard Schlink, Deutsch-deutsche Verfassungsentwicklungen im Jahre 1990,
in DIEVERFASSUNGSDISKUSSION IMJAHRDERDEUTSCHEN EINHEIT 19-20 (Bernd Guggenberger
& Tine Stein eds., 1991).
134. QUINT, supranote 81, at 20-21.
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GDR to the Federal Republic by way of Article 23 Grundgesetz3 5
-had won 164 of the People's Chamber's 400 seats; the Social
Democrats-now also linked to its West German namesake-87
seats; and the communist successor party PDS, despite or because
of its political pedigree, had managed to gain 65 seats in the
assembly." 6 Depending on how you count, the various civic and
dissenter groupings that had dominated the Roundtable discussions
1 37
together had won only about 30 seats.
In the spring of 1990, East German citizens seem to have felt
ambivalent about the future of their country. According to an
opinion poll of April 1990, 42 percent hoped for their own new
GDR constitution, 38 percent preferred a new constitution to be
drafted in East-West German cooperation, and only 9 percent of
those questioned wanted the GDR to adopt West Germany's
Grundgesetz.13' These preferences reflected the political self-image
that the Roundtable Draft embodied: that of a people ready to
engage in the "revolutionary renewal" of their country. But citizens'
impatience with forty years of deprivations and restrictions won
over their newfound civic pride. They voted like people wanting,
above all, the life that their West German cousins had enjoyed for
decades, in which elevators would work, bananas would be available
in the stores, and, if you saved enough, you could travel to Italy.
That was the life Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democratic Party had
promised. It would be achieved by a quick reunification under the
roof of the Federal Republic. Under the new CDU Prime Minister
de Maziere, the People's Chamber's constitutional work focused
primarily on creating the conditions for introducing a market
economy in the GDR. The First State Treaty between the two
Germanies of May 1990 established in Article 1 "a social market
economy" as the "common economic order of both treaty parties.' 39

135. See Mr. Kohl's Divisive Appeal for Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at A22.
136. Henry Kamm, German Losers Reject Victor's Invitation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990,
at A12.
137. Id.
138. Helmut Simon, Markierungen auf dem Weg zu einer neuen gesamtdeutschen
Verfassung, in DIE VERFASSUNGSDISKUSSION, supra note 133, at 139, 149.
139. Vertrag diber die Schaffung einer Wiihrungs-, Wirtschafts-, und Sozialunion [Treaty
on the Monetary, Economic, and Social Union], May 18, 1990, BGB1. II at 518.
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On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark became common currency in the
GDR. The Grundgesetz followed on October 3.14O
The Roundtable Draft did not sink into complete oblivion. Many
of its political ambitions-the social rights, the elements of direct
democracy, the environmental concerns-are reflected in the state
constitutions of the five East German Ldnder where, on a smaller
scale and under the protective mantle of federal legislation,
constitutional experiments seem less risky.' As a concession to
East German pride, the Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990, had
recommended that a "Common Constitutional Commission" of both
German parliaments should study the need for a possible "alteration
or amendment" of the Basic Law 4 2-a task that was completed in
July 1993 and that led only to minor changes. 14 3 Conservative West
German legal academics praised the Commission primarily for its
restraint: 'The Grundgesetz got away with a black eye."'4 4 Even
most of those West German observers who had watched with
sympathy the Roundtable's attempts at constitutional innovation
were glad to see the Basic Law extended to the former GDR. At a
meeting of the prestigious West German Association of Public Law
Teachers in April 1990 in Berlin (to which no East German public
law professor seems to have been invited), most participants had
favored the incorporation of the GDR into the Federal Republic
under Article 23 of the Basic Law.'45 Few Germans appeared to
mind that, once again, a German constitution had been accepted
without plebiscite. The legitimacy of a constitution "is not primarily
achieved by a one-time formal act of popular acceptance but by its
formative imprint on the daily affairs of a state," wrote Constitutional Court Justice Hans Klein.'4 6 The peaceful revolution in the
GDR turned out not to have been a revolution, after all. It was an
140. Einigungsvertrag [German Reunification Treaty], Aug. 31, 1990, BGBl. II at 855, art.
5 [hereinafter Reunification Treaty].
141. See Uwe Berlit, Verfassungsgebung in den fiinf neuen Landern-ein Zwischenbericht,
25 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 437 (1992).
142. Reunification Treaty, supra note 140, at art. 5.
143. QUINT, supra note 81, at 55.
144. Thus the title of the report by Isensee, supranote 131.
145. Gilbert Gornig, Die Sondertagung der Vereinigung der deutsechen Staatsrechtslehrer,
Berlin 1990, 29 DER STAAT 371 (1990).
146. Hans Klein, Staatsziele im Verfassungsgesetz, 106 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr
729, 730 (1991).
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"implosion,"'4 7 a collapse of socialism under its own monstrous
weight, that could not generate the reformatory energy that the
public acceptance of the Roundtable Draft would have required.
B. The first GDR Constitution of 1949 died not quite as rapidly as
the Roundtable Draft. Instead, it atrophied as the SED tightened its
hold over the political process. Already the first elections for the
People's Chamber in 1950 were not conducted under the system of
proportional representation created by Article 51 of the constitution
but under the Party's preferred "united list," which included the
delegates of all parties standing for election and which a voter
did not even have to mark but simply could drop, unmarked and
openly, into the urn. 14 1 Under the constitution, amendments
required a two-thirds majority or at least two-thirds of the total
number of deputies. 149 The new election law that changed Article 51
to introduce the collective list vote' 5 0-as virtually every piece of
GDR legislation in the years to come-was passed unanimously.'5 '
In 1952, the federal structure of the GDR was abolished and
replaced by a highly centralized, three-tiered system of executive
and legislative bodies.'52 The upper house, the Ldnderkammer,
continued to exist as a ghost of its former self until it, too, was
dissolved in 1958.153 In 1968, the People's Chamber passed a new
constitution that was slightly more realistic than the 1949 document had been; in 1974, this constitution, too, was thoroughly
4
remodeled.1
The 1949 Constitution's chapter on civil rights, under the hopeful
heading "Contents and Limits of State Power," did not enable a
citizen to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, which the
147. THAYSEN, supra note 83, at 148.

148. AMOS, supra note 35, at 329.
149. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK (1949) art. 83,

2

(1949)(G.D.R.).
150. Gesetz Uber die WahIen zur Volkskammer [Election Law], Aug. 9, 1950, GBI. DDR II
at 743 (G.D.R.).
151. AMOS, supra note 35, at 329.
152. Gesetz uiber die weitere Demokratisierung des Aufbaus und der Arbeitsweise der
staatlichen Organe [Restructuring of the National Government], July 23, 1952, GB1. DDR II
at 613 (G.D.R.).
153. Gesetz iber die Auflosung der Lnderkammer der DDR [Dissolution of the
Linderkammer], Dec. 8, 1958, GBI. DDR 11 at 867 (G.D.R.).
154. See QUINT, supra note 81, at 23.
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text expressly exempted from judicial review. 1 5 But under Articles
7 and 33, all legislation violating the equal rights of women or of
children born outside of marriage had been abrogated, and ordinary
courts were authorized to disregard discriminatory laws and fashion
new egalitarian rules. 156 East German judges did a good job of
bringing inherited bourgeois family law provisions into line with
constitutional requirements, and Articles 7 and 33 were much cited
in the early case law. So were some of the constitutional rights
protecting citizens against invasions by the government. But the
Supreme Court revamped their meaning. For instance, Article 138
had promised the establishment of administrative courts to review
the legality of government decisions violating individual rights, and
for a short time after its passage, a few administrative courts were
actually created at Land level and did a creditable job of curtailing
breaches of the law by local authorities. But they were soon closed
down. When citizens attempted to use the ordinary courts to
challenge illegal administrative acts, they were stopped by the new
East German Supreme Court, which held in June 1950 that the
constitution's announcement of administrative courts implied that
ordinary civil courts had no authority to deal with suits against the
executive. 57 The new administrative courts were never established.
The Supreme Court turned other constitutional provisions that
protected rights againstthe state into rules facilitating the state's
invasions into private territory. Article 22 of the 1949 Constitution
had pledged the protection of property, and Article 24, in a sentence
almost identical to one found in the Grundgesetz and the Weimar
Constitution of 1919, had required that "its use does not run counter
to the public weal." The East German Supreme Court ignored
Article 22 and used Article 24 to transfer, in Robin Hood fashion,
legal advantages from owners to nonowners, usually from landlords
to tenants. 5 8 But the Court's scariest and best known reference to
155. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK (1949) art. 89,

1

(G.D.R.) (emphasis added).
156. Id. at art. 7, 2; art. 33, 2.
157. See Oberstes Gericht in Zivilsachen [OGZ] [Supreme Court in Civil Matters] June 7,
1950, 1 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts in Zivilsachen [OGZ] 12 (DDR); see also OGZ
Aug. 22, 1951, 1 OGZ 194; OGZ May 16, 1951, 1 OGZ 151; OGZ Sept. 20, 1950, 1 OGZ 40;
OGZ Jan. 10, 1951, 1 OGZ 88; OGZ Feb. 28, 1951, 1 OGZ 106.
158. See OGZ July 5, 1950, 1 OGZ 19; OGZ Sept. 20, 1951, 1 OGZ 221.
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the constitution involved criminal law. It relied on Article 6, which
began by proclaiming "equal protection under law" and then, in its
second paragraph, listed a number of antidemocratic activities such
as "incitement to the boycott of democratic institutions" that should
be considered "felonies in the meaning of the Criminal Code." The
provision had been drafted by one of the bourgeois members of the
Constitutional Committee with the intention of defending the new
democracy against attacks by those who, as the Nazis had done,
might use the constitution only to undermine it.' In a decision of
October 4, 1950, the Supreme Court held Article 6 to be "directly
applicable criminal law"; chose as the penalties that would apply to
this new crime-which the constitutional text, understandably, had
not included-the penalties that the Criminal Code provided for
other "felonies," including the death penalty; and declared that the
provision protected "the state order of the German Democratic
Republic in its entirety."'"
For a number of years, the Supreme Court used Article 6 as a
catch-all sanction to repress whatever real or imagined opposition
might possibly threaten the regime. Jehovah's Witnesses, spies or
presumed spies, "terrorists," former entrepreneurs, neo-Fascists,
and dissenting high school students all could be accused of "incitement to boycott" and could receive very heavy sentences.' 6' Lower
courts applied the constitutional provision in harmless cases of
assaults or insults directed against local dignitaries. In 1957, an
amendment to the Criminal Code introduced a number of more
precisely defined crimes against the state,162 and Article 6 was no
longer needed to keep dissent and criticism under control. The 1949
GDR Constitution no longer functioned as a legal text. By then, it
had already lost whatever civic loyalty it ever had commanded.
C.The West German Grundgesetz, on the other hand, did very
well. In March 1949, while the Parliamentary Council was still
working on the draft, 40 percent of a sample of West Germans had
159. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
160. See Oberstes Gericht in Strafsachen [OGSt] [Supreme Court in Criminal Matters] Oct.
4, 1950, 1 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts in Strafsachen [OGSt] 33, 40 (G.D.R.).
161. See, e.g., OGSt May 25, 1952, 2 0GSt 37; OGSt May 1, 1952, 2 OGSt 14; OGSt Feb.
12, 1952, 2 OGSt 7.
162. Strafrechtsergiinzungsgesetz [Law Supplementing the Criminal Code], Dec. 11, 1957,
GB1. DDR I at 643 (G.D.R.).
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been "uninterested" and 33 percent "not very interested" in their
future constitution. By 1955, six years after its ratification, 30
percent approved of the Basic Law, but 51 percent still admitted to
ignorance of its contents. 6 3 Today, regardless of whether citizens
know what it provides, the Grundgesetz is the backbone of German
' 4
democracy. From Jiirgen Habermas's "Verfassungspatriotismus"'
6
5
to the popularity of "constitutional complaints,'
the constitution
is a visible presence in public life. The Constitutional Court is
regularly called upon to settle national debates about abortion,
access to higher education, same-sex marriage, the proper legal path
to Germany's reunification, the involvement of German troops in the
Afghan war-the table of contents of the Court's decisions cover
every important topic in post-war German history. And, for that
matter, some unimportant ones as well: when Land Cultural
Ministers decided to reform the rules of German orthography, the
Court was asked to settle spelling issues.'6 6 It is one of the most
respected institutions in the country: in January 2001, 76 percent
of a sample of German voters declared that they have "great" or
"considerable confidence" in the Constitutional Court, compared to
54 percent who said that they trust the general
courts and 52
67
Government.
Federal
the
trust
who
percent
For almost fifty years, the Grundgesetz has been an effective
teacher of the nation. For example, in October 1948, half a year
before the Basic Law abolished capital punishment in the Federal
Republic, 74 percent of West Germans approved of the death
penalty. 6 ' In 2002, the figure was 23 percent.' 69 Of course, rapid
163. BEWEGT VON DER HOFFNUNG, supra note 1, at 9.
164. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 74,76
(2001).
165. In 2006, 5918 constitutional complaints were submitted to the Court, 96.8 percent of
its caseload. See Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Aufgaben, Verfahren, und Organisation -

Jahresstatistik 2006 [Federal Constitutional Court: Tasks, Procedures, and Organization Annual Statistics 2006], available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.deorganisation/
statistik_2006.html.
166. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 14, 1998, 1
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 1640/97 (F.R.G.).
167. Infratest Dimap, ARD DeutschlandTREND (Jan. 2001), http://www.infratest-dimap.
del?aid=44&id=39.
168. JAHRBUCH DER OFFENTLICHEN MEINUNG 1947-1955, at 206 (Elisabeth Noelle & Erich
Peter Neumann eds., 1956).
169. 11 ALLENSBACHER JAHRBUCH DER DEMOSKOPIE 1998-2002, at 676 (Elisabeth Noelle-

1338

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1307

social and moral change lay in the air, and the liberalization of the
political climate in the Federal Republic cannot be credited solely to
the constitution. In fact, the rejection of the death penalty by the
Basic Law had been something of an accident: a right-wing member
of the Parliamentary Council, who wanted to put an end to Allied
executions of Nazi war criminals, proposed the abolition, and his
unexpected support was endorsed by the Social Democratic Party,
which had previously despaired of finding the necessary majority for
the reform. 7 ° But a development that began fortuitously was
continued with conviction. The Basic Law's profound respect for the
dignity of human life'' found public meaning in numerous Constitutional Court decisions and over the years, encouraged not only the
popular rejection of the death penalty, but also a redefinition of
prison policies. In June 1977, the Court thus held that human
dignity implied the right to hope and that even life sentences
required regular review procedures offering realistic chances of
release.7 2 With respect to some particularly loaded moral issues, the
Court itself had to learn to shed its prejudices. The same
Bundesverfassungsgerichtthat in 1957 declared male homosexuality
to be a legitimate object of criminal penalties'7 3 in 2002 upheld
Germany's same-sex civil union law against attacks that it violated
' 74
the constitution's express protection of "marriage and the family.'
But the Court definitely took the lead in the national learning
process. It gave citizens who were accustomed to being ashamed of
their country's past something to look up to and be proud of.
The Basic Law and the Constitutional Court's imaginative and
energetic interpretations were influential far beyond Germany's
borders. The Grundgesetz served as a model for recent West
European constitutions, such as the constitutions of Greece,
Portugal, or Spain,' 5 as well as for the constitutions of other postNeumann & Renate Kocher eds., 2002).
170. Charles Lane, The Paradoxesof a Death Penalty Stance, WASH. POST, June 4, 2005,
at A17.
171. Article 1 of the Basic Law states: 'The dignity of man is inviolable. To honor and
protect it is the obligation of all state power." GRUNDGESETZ [GG], art 1 (F.R.G.).
172. BVerfG June 21, 1977,45 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
187 (F.R.G.).
173. BVerfG May 10, 1957, 6 BVerfGE 389 (F.R.G.).
174. BVerfG July 17, 2002, 55 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2543.
175. See generally GRUNDGESETZ UND DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG IM
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authoritarian countries, such as South Africa.1" 6 Many of the new
democratic constitutions in Eastern Europe borrowed not only
structural devices from the Basic Law-the "constructive vote of noconfidence,"1 7' for instance, has been popular-but also its system
of constitutional review and its understanding of basic rights.
German constitutional thought spread to Hungary by way of
fellowships that future Hungarian constitutional justices spent at
the Constitutional Court and at German universities.1 7 8 Parts of the
Court's jurisprudence, such as the principle of "proportionality" or
the "third party effect of constitutional rights" (Drittwirkung)
became "constitutional export articles"'7 9 to courts abroad. It may
not be an exaggeration to call the Basic Law the most successful
constitution of the twentieth century.
III. WHAT EXPLAINS THESE CONSTITUTIONS' FATES?
So are we to conclude that reform-oriented constitutions looking
to the future will be unlikely to realize their goals, while constitutions solidly grounded in tradition and with modest hopes will
probably succeed? Not so fast. For one thing, both East German
constitutions I discussed failed not for structural but for political
reasons: the 1949 Constitution, because the powerful Party that had
helped to draft it also was intent on pushing it aside; the 1990
Roundtable Constitution, because its drafters had mistakenly
believed themselves to be legitimated by a revolutionary surge of
popular support. We do not know how these constitutions would
have done under more favorable conditions.
More importantly, the Grundgesetz did not continue to be as
unpresuming and straightforward as it started out. The Constitutional Court's interpretations of the Basic Law invested it with
rapidly increasing political significance. Only a few months after its
SPIEGEL AUSLANDISCHER VERFASSUNGSENTWICKLUNG (Christian Starck ed., 1990).
176. See generallyJORG FEDTKE, DIE REZEPTION VONVERFASSUNGSRECHT: SODAFRIKA 1993-

1996 (2000).
177. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 67 (F.R.G.).
178. See generally CATHERINE DUPRA, IMPORTING THE LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST
TRANSITIONS: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY

(2003).
179. Dieter Grimm, Die Karriereeines Boykottaufrufs, 40 DIE ZEIT 11 (2001).
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establishment in September 1951, the Court held that Article 20 of
the constitution, which describes Germany as a "democratic and
social state," was an immediately applicable rule that governed the
construction of all law and required the state to actively pursue
social justice. 8 0 Although the Court to this day has largely left it to
the legislature how this goal should be accomplished, the "socialstate clause" has played an important role in "domesticating
capitalism"'' and legitimating the welfare state. 'The state is
obligated to protect human dignity especially in situations in which
citizens are in need of help," the Court said in 2001, upholding an
old-age mandatory state insurance system against attacks that it
violated the freedom of individual decision making.'8 2
The Constitutional Court's case law on Article 20 of the
Grundgesetzreflects a change in the understanding of constitutional
rights. These rights used to be seen as individual weapons that a
citizen could wield against the state to challenge and defeat it in the
courtroom. But what the Germans call Teilhaberechte-the rights
to share in the country's social wealth-are realized in more
collective ways. The Constitutional Court has used Article 20
primarily to uphold welfare legislation against accusations that it
infringed upon traditional defensive rights 8 or to strike down
legislation that ignored the special circumstances of particularly
needy subgroups of the population-requiring, for instance, that
incomes supporting no more than the "existential needs" of an
earner remain tax exempt." Only in rare cases-usually in
connection with Article 1, the right to human dignity-has the
Court enforced Teilhaberechte as immediate individual claims
against the state.' 8 The constitution's "social-state clause" has
benefited far more Germans in their role as citizens than in their
role as individual litigants. As an institutional commitment to social
justice, the clause's legal impact, nevertheless, has been substantial.
180. Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 19, 1951, 1
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 97, 105 (F.R.G.).
181. PETER BADuRA, VERWALTUNGSRECHT IM LIBERALEN UND IM SOZIALEN RECHTSSTAAT 16
(1966).
182. BverfG Apr. 3, 2001, 103 BVerfGE 197 (221) (F.R.G.).
183. See, e.g., BVerfG Feb. 25, 1960, 10 BVerfGE 354 (F.R.G.).
184. See, e.g., BVerfG June 8, 2004, 110 BVerfGE 412 (F.R.G.).
185. See, e.g., BVerfG June 22, 1977, 45 BVerfGE 376 (385) (F.R.G.).
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The Article 20 caselaw demonstrates the constitution's transformation from a container of individual rights into a moral blueprint
for society. Early in the Court's existence, its famous Lath decision
of 1958 interpreted the constitution's catalogue of basic rights as an
"objective value order applicable to all areas of the law."' 6 The
Court's subsequent case law has confirmed and refined the view of
the constitution as the embodiment of a coherent political value
system. That means that the Basic Law has important things to say
about all legal events and interactions in the country. It colors the
private relationships between citizens whose legal claims against
each other have to be interpreted in the light of the constitution. It
obligates the state to carry out the value judgments of the Basic
Law. It requires the legislature to respect the constitution's views
on human dignity and citizenship. The Bundesverfassungsgerichtis
careful not to tell parliament how to do its job, but it guides its
choices: it has warned, for instance, against the "unconstitutional
budgeting"'' 7 of public education funds, or has insisted that the
legislature honor the dignity of life by finding some way to express
its moral disapproval of abortion.'
Such all-embracing constitutional commitment runs afoul of the
careful lawyerly distinctions used in the past to classify the constitution's various imperatives. Under the Court's stewardship, the
public/private distinction, the differences between subjective
''rights" and objective "state goals," even the separation of powers
have become blurrier than before. Take, for instance, the "state
goal" of environmental protection, which (at the prodding of the
East-West German Reunification Treaty) was added to the Basic
Law in 2002.89 It obligates the legislature "in its responsibility
towards future generations to protect the natural foundation of life."
The new Article 20a does not entitle individuals to sue the state, nor
does it mean, as Christopher Stone suggested in 1972, that trees
have been given standing. 9 ° But, like the "social-state clause," the
186. BVerfG Jan. 15, 1958, 7 BVerfGE 198 (F.R.G.).
187. BVerfG May 3, 1972, 33 BVerfGE 303 (F.R.G.).
188. BVerfG Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1 (F.R.G.).
189. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 20a (F.R.G.). Note that this Article was added by Gesetz zur
Anderung des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending the Basic Law], July 26, 2002, BGB1. I at 2862
(F.R.G.).
190. See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal
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provision can be used to uphold environmental legislation that
places burdens, for example, on someone's also constitutionally
protected right to property. And if the legislature drags its feet in
passing needed environmental legislation, the Constitutional Court
would probably find ways to remind it of its duty. As one Constitutional Court Justice put it in 1991: "The relationship between
legislature and judiciary that has developed under the Grundgesetz
is marked by the characteristic feature that constitutional norms
and, in particular, basic rights, acquire more impact, the slower the
legislature is in enforcing them."'9 1
In this view, the first and the third branch of government are no
longer separated by a firewall but are engaged in a continuing
conversation about how best to realize the goals of the constitution.
For instance, German abortion law-whose constitutional status is
complicated by the fact that, mindful of the contempt for human life
under Nazi rule, the constitution's "right to life" is understood to
protect the fetus' 9 2-has been developed in the back and forth of
various proposals and responses between the legislature and the
Constitutional Court. The same has been true for Hungarian
abortion law. Kim Scheppele has described a similar form of interbranch cooperation between the Constitutional Court and the
executive when the Hungarian Constitutional Court, by limiting the
enforcement of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1995, defended the
Hungarian government's policy of gradual social change against the
pressures of the World Bank, which favored a more ruthless
acceleration of market policies.1 93 Citizens, too, can be involved in
the work of advancing constitutional values. The German "constitutional complaint," for instance, was introduced in 1951 to give
individualsa final chance to vindicate their personal rights. Today,
by way of statutory change and case law, it has taken on objective
general significance as a means of utilizing individual complaints to
stimulate constitutional change.' Although under the initial rules
Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
191. Klein, supra note 146, at 732.
192. BVerfG Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1 (F.R.G.).
193. Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1921,
1945-47 (2004).
194. See generallyChristoph Gusy, Die Verfassungsbeschwerde,in 1 FESTSCHRIFT 50 JAHRE
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 641 (Peter Badura & Horst Dreier eds., 2001).
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of standing a citizen could bring a constitutional complaint to avert
"a severe and unavoidable"'9 5 impairment of his rights, the Court
today will accept a constitutional complaint only if "it serves to
safeguard constitutional law and to further its interpretation and
19 Under the Hungarian constitution, an individual
improvement.""
citizen can initiate the abstract constitutional review of legislation
that has no bearing whatsoever on his individual rights. Modern
constitutionalism has become a collective civic enterprise.
With these developments in mind, it seems that the 1990 East
German Roundtable Draft actually came much closer to both the
Grundgesetz and to East European constitutional deliberations of
the time than the Draft's creators and its critics may have thought.
Many of the Roundtable's innovations, such as the cautiously
defined protection of social rights, the third-party impact of
constitutional rights, the introduction of "state goals," and even
the disapproval of life-term prison sentences, had already been
anticipated by the case law of the Constitutional Court. The same
is true for the post-socialist East European constitutions. These
constitutions, too, contain many features that once seemed typical
of pre-1989 socialist constitutions but that, as we have seen, also
characterize the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht:
the notion that the state owes care and solicitude to its citizens, the
articulation of social rights, their protection by way of institutional
guarantees, the affirmation of state goals, and the perception of the
constitution as a roadmap to a "good" society. You might say that
the future, which the drafters of the "provisional" Basic Law were
largely blotting from their minds, has returned to European
constitution making.
As did the Roundtable Draft, the new East European constitutions have met with a lot of criticism for their "socialist" ways.
Western constitutional lawyers worried that their catalogues of
"social rights" to work, housing, education, healthcare, and the like
were unenforceable and would only confuse and disappoint postsocialist citizens' understanding of "the rule of law"; that even if it
could be given legal meaning, the concept of "state goals" would
195. Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [Law on the Federal Constitutional Court], July 21,
1956, BGB1. I at 662 (§ 91a) (F.R.G.).
196. BVerfG July 14, 1998, 98 BVerfGE 218 (243) (F.R.G.).
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encourage courts to meddle in matters that were for the legislature
to decide; that giving "horizontal effect" to constitutional rights
would interfere with the efficiency of market mechanisms; and
that the constitutions would encourage East European citizens'
continued dependence on the state. 9 7 '"This is communism pure
and simple,"'9 8 Andris Soj6 wrote in 1996 when the Hungarian
Constitutional Court used the constitution's social rights provisions
to halve the intended impact of the government's austerity legislation.
Under Communist rule, of course, nobody could have sued to
challenge the legislation's constitutionality in the first place. The
drafters of the new post-socialist constitutions have learned from
experience to mistrust the state and, therefore, have introduced
powerful judicial systems to defend individual rights. But Eastern
Europeans have also learned from the days of socialism that
everyone needs a social safety net in case his own strength fails him.
Modern industrial society is simply too fragmented, too complex, too
interdependent, and too unpredictable to support the capitalist
myth that each individual, all by himself, can be the architect of his
own fate. In 1950, when the German Constitutional Court had not
yet been established, Harold Berman, in his wonderful book Justice
in Russia, characterized Soviet law as "parental" law that took the
citizen by the hand and guided him in ways that the Party thought
would serve him best.' 99 In 1963, Berman added in the second
edition of his book: "It is the author's intention to stress these
'parental' elements as characteristic not only of Soviet law but also,
increasingly in the twentieth century, of other legal systems."2 °° The
Constitutional Court's Lath decision, which paved the way for the
Basic Law's moral authority over all areas of the law, was by then
five years old. Today, it seems self-evident that the Basic Law
protects those too weak or even just too careless to protect themselves. Assuring for everyone the necessary provisions for old age,
197. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001);
Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 2 E. EuR. CONST. REv. 35 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
American Advice and New Constitutions,1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 173 (2000).
198. Andris Saj6, How the Rule of Law Killed HungarianWelfare Reform, 5 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. 31 (1996).
199. HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA 3-4 (1950).
200. HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR 368 (rev. ed. 1963).
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for instance, "is part of the social tasks of the state community," the
Court wrote in 2001.2° 1 Relying on people's own insurance is too
chancy: "The population lacks the necessary awareness of the
risks."20 2 Parents see farther into the future than their children.
I have managed to return to the topic I began with: the perception
of time in German constitution making. A constitution "does not just
want to regulate that which exists but also wants to be a roadmap
for the future," wrote one of the judges of the Constitutional
Court.2 0 3 This view squares well with a parental state concerned for
its children's welfare. But perhaps it was not the Constitutional
Court's future orientation that served the Grundgesetz so well; perhaps it was its flexibility and openness for change. Constitutional
judges have the difficult task of giving contemporary meaning to
"eternal" rights. 2 4 To do so they must be both loyal to the constitution's values and imaginative in their responses to the dangers that
may threaten them. "Free speech," for instance, must be defended
against different attacks and in different ways in 2008 than in 1949.
Judges thus should be alert to the political and social culture of
their day. This is particularly true in post-totalitarian democracies
that have to learn a new moral vocabulary and in which unforeseen
difficulties and the lack of political experience may require imaginative responses.
The German Constitutional Court was greatly helped in its
pedagogical role by an appointment process that fosters the
selection of moderates. Because half of the justices are chosen by the
Federal Parliament and half by the Federal Council,2 "5 with both
houses often dominated by opposing parties, the appointment
process usually is preceded by extensive negotiations. Justices quite
often are appointed, as it were, in pairs in order to achieve a better
201. BVerfG Mar. 21, 2001, 103 BVerfGE 195 (221) (F.R.G.).
202. Id. at 223.
203. Klein, supranote 146, at 735.
204. In Cohens v. Virginia, John Marshall said that "[a] constitution is designed to
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." See Donald Kommers,
The Basic Law: A Fifty Year Assessment, 53 SMU L. REV. 477, 481 (2000) (quoting Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821)). The Grundgesetz supports this view with its
"eternity clause" of Article 79, para. 3, that exempts Article 1 (human dignity) and Article 20
(federalism, separation of powers, the rule of law, and the social welfare state) from any
alteration by amendment. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 79 (F.R.G.).
205. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 94 (F.R.G.).
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political balance, and the selection of fundamentalists of any sort is
rare. The Basic Law left such details as the number of judges and
the length of their tenure to ordinary legislation, and it took some
experimentation to arrive at the current rules: the Court now has
two Senates, with eight judges each, sitting for a nonrenewable term
of twelve years."' The term limits ensure a regular turnover at the
Court, and so prevent the entrenchment of particular political
approaches; the even number of justices forces them to compromise
in close cases. The men and women chosen in this way have been
remarkable for their moral commitment and their open minds. It
helped that the constitution did not settle all appointment choices
and thus left room for a flexibility more easily achievable by
ordinary law.
So maybe a constitution's success depends on its adaptability to
change and on the political sensitivities of its interpreters. Maybe,
instead of talking about time orientations, I should have talked
about the structural choices facing the drafters of my three German
constitutions. But this Essay was concerned with their history. Let
someone else deal with the architectural problems of constitution
making.
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